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MERKEZI˙ YERLESTI˙RME SI˙STEMLERI˙NDE U¨NI˙VERSI˙TE SIRALAMALARININ
AC. IKLANMIS¸ TERCI˙HLERI˙: TU¨RKI˙YE O¨RNEG¯I˙
Hayri Alper Arslan
Ekonomi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manları: Ahmet Alkan, Fırat I˙nceog˘lu
Anahtar Kelimeler: u¨niversite o¨g¯renci kabulu, u¨niversite tercihi , yerlestirme sonuc¸ları
O¨zet
Bu c¸alıs¸ma 2005 yılı O¨grenci Sec¸me Sınavının (O¨SS) veriseti ve Tu¨rkiye’yi temsil eden
lise son sınıf o¨g¯rencileri arasında yapılan bir anket c¸alıs¸masından elde edilen verilerle, u¨niversite
o¨grenci es¸les¸me olus¸umunu incelemektedir. O¨SYM sistemindeki o¨g¯rencilerin ve u¨niversite
bo¨lu¨mlerinin karakteristik o¨zellikleri ve u¨niversite tercih davranıs¸ları kullanılarak o¨g¯rencilerin
ac¸ıklanmıs¸ tercihleri incelenecektir. Verisetleri o¨g¯rencilerin egitim gec¸mis¸leri, sınav perfor-
mansları, detaylı sosyoekonomik ve demografik bilgilerini ic¸ermekte ve bo¨ylece o¨g¯rencilerin
bu bilgileri kullanılarak onların ac¸ıklanmıs¸ tercihleri tahmin edilmektedir. Son olarak tahmin
edilen tercihler yerles¸tirmelerde ve onların is¸gu¨cu¨ piyasası u¨zerindeki etkilerini incelemek
ic¸in kullanılmaktadır.
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Abstract
This paper explores the economics of match formation in the context of university en-
trance exam using a dataset obtained from Turkish university entrance system and a survey of
senior high school students from the representative sample of Turkey. I provide a description
of the student and department characteristics in the CSSP (Center for Students Selection and
Placement) mechanism and utilize detailed information regarding university selection behav-
ior to infer students’ revealed preferences. Data allows me to estimate a very rich preference
specification that takes into account a large number of educational background attributes,
detailed demographic and socioeconomic information, along with exam performances. I de-
velop consideration sets for students to eliminate strategic behavior from our estimation and
compare them with some benchmark choice sets. Finally, placement outcomes and their
effects on labor market are investigated by using estimated preferences.
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1 Introduction
Each year millions of high school graduates make decisions about whether to continue
their education, and if so, where to apply and enroll. Some students take this decision rela-
tively simple because the existence of a particular academic program in a specific institution,
the proximity of an institution of higher education, or a host of other factors make a certain
school more favorable than others. For others, the choice process is difficult as they attempt to
find an institution that will match their educational goals, interests and financial constraints.
College choice decision making is important for the student because it directly affects
students’ future career path. A students college choice strongly influences his or her pro-
fessional career, and there is evidence to indicate that the type of postsecondary education a
student completes yields differential outcomes (Hossler et al. 1989 [8]). Even if these differ-
ential outcomes may be less pronounced when one controls for confounding factors such as
choice of academic major and academic ability, there are considerable differences in choice
preferences that cause change in the outcomes.
There are numerous studies that provide explanations for the differences in college go-
ing decision and academic major choices. These studies also give insight to understand the
outcomes of these differences in students’ future lives and labor markets outcomes. Kane
(2001) [9]gathered college going literature and showed that differences in students attributes
have significant effects on decision. Especially family income and their attitudes towards ed-
ucation, race, and gender change college going decision significantly. Polachek (1978) [12]
showed females prefer education and fine arts majors more and they avoid generally high
earning majors such as engineering and business. Ma (2009)[10] worked on effects of family
socioeconomic status and parental involvement in major choices. Balsamo et al. (2012) [2]
analyzed personality effects on the selection of majors. Saygin (2011) [14] showed gender
differences in major selection by using Turkish data. On the whole, we can see from the
literature that the preferences of students for various social and income groups, ethnic groups
and gender are considerably different and some groups are particularly disadvantaged with
these preferences (e.g. being female and belonging to a lower socioeconomic group).
On the other hand, college choice preferences and their impacts are not sufficiently ex-
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plored in the literature. Punj et al. (1978) [13] investigated graduate business college selec-
tions and found that distance, cost, and quality were the main criteria. DesJardins et al. (1999)
[4] looked at college preferences to assess the marketing strategies of land-grant universities.
In this paper, I attempt to show the differences in college choice preferences, the effects
of students’ attributes on preferences (such as gender, income, location, etc.) and the im-
pacts of these choice preferences on the outcome of these placements, by estimating revealed
preferences of students for college rankings. In order to focus particularly on college choice,
major choices and constraints from the university entrance system are controlled. Hence the
results obtained allow me to examine purely college choice preferences. I use detailed ad-
ministrative data from the Turkish university entrance test in 2005 and a representative survey
conducted by Alkan et al. including students’ socioeconomic, demographic and educational
background as well as their preparation for the exam. Data includes applicants’ choices over
all university programs so that I can directly investigate the potential differences in choices
made by different groups.
University placement system is centralized in Turkey and administrated by CSSP (Center
for Student Selection and Placement). A standardized exam at national level is conducted ev-
ery year and the applicants make their college choices after they learn their scores. Because
college departments’ ranking over students depend on exam scores, students’ choices are af-
fected from this knowledge. Also information on the previous years’ placement patterns give
an insight to students’ evaluation of their scores and impacts students’ choices. Another cru-
cial information about choices is of students’ own ranking of various departments. Students
do not just report their choices as a set; they rank them up to 24. Hence these criteria require
special attention in analyzing students’ choices in the CSSP mechanism.
There is also a benchmark study for this paper in the matching literature. Hitsch et
al.(2009) (2010) [6] [7] analyzed mate matching by using data on user attributes and interac-
tions from an online dating site and estimated preferences in mate selection. I use a similar
setting for the estimation with their study; however, there are considerable differences be-
tween these studies. First, their data provide users’ choice sets. On the dating site, users
initially browse people in the database and email people whom they would like to date. Thus,
people that have been browsed form users’ choice sets and people that have been emailed
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are selected mates from these sets. This is the main advantage of their study because they
could estimate mate preferences easily according to these sets. A second advantage is the
possibility for users to send unlimited numbers of emails. Hence users send emails without
considering they will be refused. In my data, choice sets are not known. Certainty of de-
partment side rankings in the CSSP mechanism makes departments inactive in the market.
This certainty requires students to calculate their position in the department side when they
are making choices. On the other hand, I have an advantage of using students’ rankings of
departments in the estimation.
The empirical challenge of this thesis is to appoint appropriate choice sets to the students
and estimate revealed preferences within these appointed sets. There are almost 7,700 num-
ber of departments in the CSSP and all of them are a potential candidate for each student.
I develop consideration sets for students to reduce the number of departments and make es-
timation significant, thus eliminating potential strategic behavior of students born from the
CSSP mechanism. Then I compare results obtained from using consideration sets with those
obtained from using benchmark random choice sets. Comparisons show that results from
estimations using consideration sets are more suitable for my analysis because they explain
variation better.
Factors affecting students’ university exam performances such as socioeconomic and edu-
cational background could be also considered in the college and major choices in the central-
ized mechanisms. Because of score-dependent choices, some departments are unreachable
to some students. Therefore, impacts of students’ educational background, exam preparation
and their abilities on scores affects college choices indirectly. However, I don’t use these fac-
tors as choice criteria in the analysis. My setting investigates choices after students learn their
scores and we accept scores as fixed attributes of students. Alkan et al. (2008) [1] analyzed
these factors’ effects on exam performance.
Estimation results show that there are significant differences in college choice prefer-
ences. Different attributes of students such as gender, income, parents’ education and location
change students choices and make clear impacts on placement outcomes. Some of the prefer-
ences are common such as avoidance of departments whose entrance scores differ from stu-
dents’ scores, long distance between college and hometown, foundation colleges (i.e. private
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universities established by foundations in Turkey), and two-year vocational programs. How-
ever, the differences in attributes change preferences’ magnitudes and these directly change
influence placements and future outcomes.
The thesis is organized as follows: in Section 2, I provide details about the institutional
setting in Turkey; I describe the data and show some descriptive statistics to motivate the
rest of the paper. In Section 3 , I explain the research design and report the main results. In
Section 4, I discuss estimated results and their effects. In section 5, I conclude.
2 Institutional Setting and Data Description
In this section, I outline the institutional setting of high school and college education in
Turkey, and then describe the summary statistics of the data set of high school graduates in
the empirical analysis. This is helpful to understand college and major selection process in
Turkey.
In the empirical analysis, I use two data sets on high school students who have graduated
and entered University Entrance Exam (OSS) in the period 2005. The first data set is from the
survey which is conducted by Alkan et al. The survey asked questions to senior high school
students who would be entering OSS exam in that year about socioeconomic, politic, demo-
graphic and educational background as well as information on students’ preparation for the
exam. The second data set is obtained from CSSP and provides students’ OSS performance
as well as their university and department choices. A rich descriptive analysis of OSS can be
found in Alkan et al. (2008)[1].
I restrict the analysis to the representative student survey. By making this restriction, I
can add more attributes to the estimation of students’ utility function apart from exam per-
formance information. The data sets are linked by using students’ identification numbers,
thus eliminating loss of observations in the merger. The advantage of using the linked data
set is that it enables one to study determinants of college choice by linking rich data sets on
students’ achievement at high school, socioeconomic background and geo-coded information
to track students’ mobility choices over time.
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2.1 High School
In 2005, compulsory education in Turkey amounted to eight years. Primary school starts
at the age of 7 and compulsory school leaving age is at age 15. Students who want go to high
school enter an exam, Lycee Entrance Examination (LEE) to be accepted to some specific
high schools. After the examination and students’ choices, each student enrolls in a High
school. If a student could not enroll in a school which takes students through central place-
ment, she could enroll in a public high school or other type of schools which don’t require
exam scores. Table 1 summarizes high school entrance requirements. High schools last 3
or 4 years depending on their type. High schools, which have foreign language education in
addition to their standard curriculum, are one year longer.
Table 1: High School Entrance Requirements
School Type Entrance Requirements
Cok Prog. Lise N/A
Resmi Lise N/A
Imam Hatip N/A
Y.D.A. Lise GPA
Meslek Lisesi N/A
Ozel Fen Lisesi LEE
Anad. Lisesi LEE
Anad. Meslek Lis LEE
Fen Lisesi LEE
Ozel Lise LEE or N/A
Anad. Ogr. Lises LEE
There are two important criteria in high school education that directly affect university
choices. The first one is high school General Point Average (OBP). Each student obtains
a OBP according to his/her high school performance. The second effect is field selection.
In Turkey, high school education is differentiated in 4 fields in the second year. These are
Math and Science(SAY), Math and Social(EA), Social Sciences(SOZ) and Language(DIL).
Students choose one of these fields and their education continues in this direction. Field
selection is an important decision because university departments also have the same differ-
entiation and they select students with field scores in the university entrance exam. Moreover,
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students’ OBP change with university field selection. Choices made outside one’s field are
not favored by the system. Such choices are punished by reducing the OBP and students will
be asked to answer questions that are outside their field in the university exam.
2.2 University Exam and Degree Choice
There is a centralized university placement system in Turkey. Students are ranked ac-
cording to the results they attain in an centralized exam conducted by CSSP. CSSP matches
students and departments by using Gale-Shapley Stable Algorithm.(Gale-Shapley, 1958 [5])
University exam is held once a year and students are asked multiple choice questions in
different areas. The main areas of the exam are mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences,
Turkish and other foreign languages. Each area is differently weighted in each field. Hence
a student takes at least 3 different scores in the exam (Language field has a separate exam
for students who want to make choices based on Language scores.) Students declare their
choices after they learn their university exam performance and OBP. OBP is also weighted
accordingly each high schools performance in the exam. The schools whose students have
higher scores on average in the exam get more weight in calculating AOBP (called weighted
OBP) for their students.
Students’ total scores is the sum of university exam scores and AOBP scores. Each stu-
dent has a field score in the exam. For each field’s total score AOBP is added to exam scores
by multiplying different coefficients. If students make choice within field, AOBP is mul-
tiplied with coefficient 0.8 and with 0.3, if outside field. Also some school types provide
additional coefficients to special departments, i.e. Anadolu Ogretmen Lisesi provides coef-
ficients to teacher education departments. At the end of the exam period CSSP calculates
all these scores and students know their scores and ranking before making their choice of
departments.
University departments’ hypothetical ranking over students is crystal clear. Departments
are differentiated according to fields similar to students’ field options. A department ranks
students according to their total scores in the system. Therefore, there are four different
students rankings and each department prefers students with higher scores in their fields.
Students have the right to choose up to 24 departments. They rank and list their preferred
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departments in descending order and report this choice list to the CSSP. After completion of
submission of choice lists, CSSP matches departments and students by using Gale-Shapley
Stable Algorithm. Placements occur according to results of this mechanism and these place-
ments are binding.
2.3 Data Description
The analysis in this paper is based on a sample of 12,828 students from different geo-
graphical areas in Turkey. Sample selection techniques are explained in Alkan et al. [1]
Table 2 shows sample and population summary statistic about exam performances.
Table 2: Sample and Population Exam Performances
Field Database WE <Level1 Level1 Level2 Total
SAY
Senior Student
44107 69,369 39,517 86,408
239,401 (%35)
(%18) (%29) (%17) (%36)
Sample
469 933 767 3,181
5,350 (%42)
(%9) (%17) (%14) (%60)
SOZ
Senior Student
14,916 38,232 32,421 59,158
144,777 (%21)
(%10) (%27) (%22) (%41)
Sample
260 573 472 1,549
2,854 (%22)
(%9) (%20) (%17) (%54)
EA
Senior Student
29,334 65,963 52,738 136,369
284,404 (%41)
(%10) (%23) (%19) (%48)
Sample
175 507 464 2,755
3,901 (%30)
(%4) (%13) (%12) (%71)
DIL
Senior Student
541 1,089 6,617 14,882
23,129 (%3)
(%2) (%25) (%9) (%64)
Sample
8 5 82 638
733 (%6)
(%2) (%1) (%11) (%87)
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
Field Database WE <Level1 Level1 Level2 Total
TOTAL
Senior Student
88,898 174,703 131,293 296,817
691,711 (%100)
(%13) (%25) (%19) (%43)
Sample
912 2,018 1,785 8,123
12,838 (%100)
(%7) (%16) (%14) (%63)
I refer the reader to Alkan et al.[1] for detailed descriptive analysis of 2005 OSS exam
database. In this study, OSS exam database is presented along with various descriptive ac-
counts across gender, region, school type and graduation status.
Approximately 55 percent of students made at least one choice. This means that I have
to drop nearly half of the observations for the estimation. Table 3 shows the choice ratios of
students from different high school type. Anadolu Ogretmen Lisesi, Ozel Lise and Fen Lisesi
have higher application ratio. On the other hand, Cokprogramli Lise and Resmi Lise have
the lowest apply ratio. The average scores of each school type in different fields are in Table
4. Fen Lisesi and Ozel Lise are significantly higher in average in Math and Science fields; at
the other extreme Meslek Lisesi is the lowest in all average scores.
Table 3: School Type and Choice Numbers
School Type Apply Ratio Average Number of Choices
Cok Prog. Lise 0.20 1.23
Resmi Lise 0.21 2.34
Imam Hatip 0.44 3.72
Y.D.A. Lise 0.56 8.48
Meslek Lisesi 0.57 5.46
Ozel Fen Lisesi 0.66 7.81
Anad. Lisesi 0.70 10.17
Anad. Meslek Lis 0.70 5.99
Fen Lisesi 0.82 8.97
Ozel Lise 0.86 11.11
Anad. Ogr. Lises 0.91 11.76
Average 0.55 6.57
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Table 4: School Type and Average Scores
School Type SAY SOZ EA DIL
Meslek Lisesi 94.60 104.22 99.31 0.00
Cok Prog. Lise 128.53 148.40 139.46 0.00
Anad. Meslek Lis 128.91 143.99 138.05 1.76
Imam Hatip 131.35 169.35 151.15 0.95
Resmi Lise 149.87 174.17 164.33 2.83
Ozel Fen Lisesi 182.43 206.77 201.21 13.56
Y.D.A. Lise 185.03 212.98 204.80 36.76
Anad. Ogr. Lises 212.00 233.26 228.84 57.15
Anad. Lisesi 215.87 224.55 227.70 16.09
Ozel Lise 243.98 222.08 239.73 0.00
Fen Lisesi 271.36 249.80 264.67 0.00
Average 165.85 184.85 179.15 13.41
3 Student Revealed Preference Estimation
My estimation approach is based on a sequence of ranking decisions. For each student
I appoint choice sets. Because we know students’ ranking from their choice lists, appointed
sets provide possibly browsed but unselected departments. If the cost of adding department
to the choice list is 0 in the choice set, a student s truly ranks department d up to 24 choices
where the utility of being accepted from this department Us(s,d) is greater or equal to reser-
vation utility level of entering a department vs(s). The reservation utility is the utility level
where a student is indifferent to being accepted from a particular department and being un-
matched. It can be the last choice of a student in his/her choice list or lower than this level
for students who fill their choice list. Hence a student ranks departments in the choice list if
the utility level from that department is at least as high as reservation utility level up to 24. If
the cost of adding is not 0, students rank departments strategically and the ranking does not
represent students’ true preferences.
There is one more thing to be considered regarding the students who fill their choice lists.
Because of the 24-department limit, the cost of adding departments to the choice list can
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change for these students’ choices. They withdraw some departments because the probabil-
ity of being accepted to any department drops by adding additional higher scored departments
to the list. For example, a student could exchange a department which has higher entrance
score with one that has lower entrance score even if it is a less preferred one. Hence this stu-
dent increases the probability of being accepted to a department by forgoing more preferred
departments. This situation makes it harder to assume that the cost of adding department is
0 for students who have completely filled their choice lists. However with the help of the
ranking of departments in choice lists, the ordering of choices in the list does not change
significantly. Even if the complete ordering of departments changes when a student drops
a more preferred department due to the 24-department limitation, the partial ordering of de-
partments within consideration sets does not change. Moreover, the relatively low ratio of
applicants (around 15%) who fill their lists reduces this problem.
Why some students make choice and why some don’t
Before going into the estimation of students’ departmental choices, I briefly look at the mo-
tives of students in making their choices. Because our data set also includes students who
enter the exam, earn sufficient scores in the CSSP but don’t make any departmental choice;
we can also make an analysis based on the same data. In this estimation, I use students as
unit of analysis. Students are just represented as making the choice or not. The number of
choices are insignificant if it is bigger than 0. Logistic regression is a tool for this analysis.
As I expected, total scores are the most significant factors in choice motivation (Table 5).
However, there are also important factors in making choices such as income level, parents’
education levels, and the size of the place where the student lives. Odds ratios are represented
in Table 6.
Table 5: Apply Ratio
Variables Apply a College Department
CSSP score 0.00729***
(0.000318)
Income 0.0274***
(0.0101)
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – Continued from previous page
Variables Apply a College Department
Parents education 0.134***
(0.0248)
Location type 0.116***
(0.0236)
Extra private education -0.0750***
(0.0205)
Gender 0.0989**
(0.045)
Study possibilities -0.00637
(0.0104)
Siblings number -0.0633***
(0.0115)
Anxious level for exam -0.0503***
(0.00853)
Constant -1.812***
(0.19)
Observations 10,518
Table 6: Apply Ratio Odd Ratios
Variables Odd Ratios
CSSP Score 1.007
Income 1.028
Parents Education 1.143
Location type 1.123
Extra private education 0.928
Gender 1.104
Study possibilities 0.994
Siblings number 0.939
Anxious level for exam 0.951
Reporting choices to the CSSP mechanism is costless. If a student makes choices and s/he
is not placed in any department, there will be no additional cost according to non-reporting
choice conditions for the next years. Therefore, after earning a sufficient score in the CSSP,
submitting college choices is important to understand the eagerness of students to move on
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to tertiary education. Because students who make a choice have a probability to enter a de-
partment, these students show their eagerness to go to college. On the other hand, students
who don’t make any choices directly exit from the university market or postpone entering the
market without trying their chances. Estimation results show that students who come from
small towns; who have lower income levels; who have more siblings; and who have relatively
less educated parents give up their chance to enter college more easily than others. Female
students are more eager than male students to continue tertiary education. Interestingly, stu-
dents who are more concerned about being unsuccessful in the exam tend to avoid making
choices. These results are the initial impacts of differences in attributes on students’ choice
preferences.
3.1 Discrete Choice Model
For discrete choice model we use very similar techniques based on the paper by Hirsth et
al. [6] [7] They estimate mate preferences by using interactions of users of an online dating
site. In this paper, I use students’ choices and their revealed preferences in order to estimate
college preferences.
Given the ranking decision rule, student preferences can be estimated using discrete
choice methods. We assume that student preferences depend on their own observed attributes
as well as the department’s observed attributes, and on an idiosyncratic preference shock:
Us(s,d) = Us(Xs,Xd;θs)+ εsd . We split the attribute vector and the parameter vector into
separate components: Xd = (xd,dd), θS = (βs,γ+s ,γ−s ,υs). The latent utility of student s
from a match with university department d is parameterized as (1)
Us(s,d) = x′dβ + |(xs− xd)|+γ++ |(xs− xd)|−γ−+ (1)
N
∑
k,l=1
(dsk = 1 and ddl = 1)υkl + εsd
The first component of utility is a simple linear valuation of the department’s attributes.
The other components relate the student’s preferences to his own characteristics. The dif-
ference between the department’s and student’s attributes is |xd − xs|+ if this difference is
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positive, and |xd− xs|− denotes the absolute value of this difference if the difference is neg-
ative. For example, consider the difference in points between the total score of student s
and the minimum entry score of department d. If the coefficients corresponding to the score
difference in both γ+ and γ− are negative, it means that students prefer departments closer
to their own scores. The fourth component in the utility function relates preferences to cat-
egorical attributes of both sides. Dummy variables indicating that student s and department
d possess a certain trait are represented by dsk and ddl . For example, if dsk = 1 and ddl = 1
indicate that s is from a high income group and that d is a foundation college, then the pa-
rameter υkls expresses the relative preference of rich family children for foundation college
departments.
I use a rank-ordered conditional logit model to estimate how applicants value college char-
acteristics and how the weights placed on these characteristics vary across various attributes.
Rank-ordered logistic model is also known as exploded logit model. Exploded refers to a
logit model that incorporates multiple-ranked choices for each person but not only the first
choice that gives the highest utility. (McFadden and Train 2000 [11], Train 2003 [16])
The setting of rank-ordered conditional logit model is very similar to a conditional logit
model where a coefficient is obtained for each attribute of the alternatives. In this rank-
ordered model, each applicant is assumed to have an individual choice set and the individual
choice set is assumed to include the university programs that are chosen by the applicant and
coefficients are mapped from the ranking of these alternatives. Using this method, I obtain
the coefficients for university program attributes such as scholarship status, distance from
high school city, instruction language, whether university is a public or foundation college,
cost of living index of the college city, etc.
Assuming that ranking a department in the choice list is costless, the choice probabilities
then take the rank ordered logit form:
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Prob(ranking of departments|considering departments) (2)
=
∫ ( eβxn1
∑ j=1,2,3...,24 eβxn j
eβxn2
∑ j=2,3...,24 eβxn j
...
eβxn23
∑ j=23,24 eβxn j
)
×g(β |θ)dβ
I also estimate the model with standard conditional logistic regression in order to un-
derstand effects of the ranking. In the estimation results, the second column in Table 11
represents this estimation.
3.2 A Modeling Framework for Analyzing Students Behavior
My data are in the form of students’ choice lists. Students choose and rank departments
from the CSSP department set. In order to interpret the data using a revealed preference
framework, I make the following assumption:
Assumption: Suppose a student considers two departments, d and d’, and ranks d in her/his
choice list. Then the student prefers a potential match with d over a potential match with d’.
However, I don’t have any data or information about students’ choice sets. There are
approximately 7,700 departments from 4 fields and each student has no restriction to choose
any of them. Even within the field analysis, potential choice sets are not less than 284 (Table
7). 284 does not seem to be a huge number, but most of the students make choice from
other fields and the number of departments reaches an enormous number. It is not realistic
to assume all departments are browsed by students in order to complete choice lists. Also,
working with these huge numbered choice sets is not possible for an estimation methodology.
For these reasons, appointing appropriate choice sets is the crucial part of this analysis.
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Table 7: Field Department Number
Field Number of Departments
DIL 284
EA 2509
SAY 3876
SOZ 1008
Total 7677
Strategic behavior in choices is another important point that cannot be neglected when
creating choice sets. If all of the choices represent students’ true preferences over university
departments, it is easy to reach a conclusion with this data. However, dependence of stu-
dents’ decisions on their CSSP scores could divert their choices from their true preferences.
Because CSSP mechanism allows everyone to reach past years’ placement scores, these data
generate a baseline for students to form beliefs on the probability of being accepted by a de-
partment. Hence students can calculate the probability of being matched with their choices
and they do not add unrealistic departments in their choice lists even these departments are
more preferred. This makes it difficult to make the assumption that if a student adds a depart-
ment in his/her choice list, this department is more preferred compared to departments which
are not included in the student’s choice list.
Table 8: Reverse Rankings
Score Differences With Voc. Programs Without Voc. Programs
>2 3121 2921
>5 2425 2238
>10 1782 1600
>20 1093 937
>30 666 531
>40 440 314
>50 360 235
A final crucial information in the choice lists is the rank of departments. Each student
submits choice list in a descending ordered rank. This format is useful to make inferences
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about students’ preference on selected department choice. Since CSSP mechanism uses only
scores for matching, it is expected that students rank departments in the descending order of
their minimum entry scores. If a student ranking is not in a descending order, acceptance
probability to departments with higher minimum entry scores and to departments with lower
ranks is lower, compared to students whose rankings were made in descending order. To
understand students’ order of rankings according to minimum entry scores, I check the num-
ber of students who have at least one reverse ranking in their choice lists. Reverse ranking
means ranking departments with lower minimum entry scores higher than departments with
higher minimum entry scores. Table 8 shows the numbers and the magnitude of reversals.
Vocational programs have lower entrance scores and so they may cause the differences to be
enhanced. Second column in Table 6 is for the number of students in the exclusion of the
vocational programs. Even for big differences, there is a considerable number of reversals
in students’ rankings. Thus, it is inferred that rankings of departments do not only depend
on minimum entry scores. By this way, I can exploit the ranking information in estimation
without suspecting too much whether student ranks departments strategically or not.
I develop a unique consideration set for each student based on students’ attributes revealed
from their choice lists, in order to overcome huge amount of department sets and eliminate
strategic behavior of students in their choice processes.
3.3 Consideration Sets
I construct consideration sets for each student in order to increase the explanatory power
of estimation and to be able to manage the huge number of department set. Students’ choices
and their revealed attributes from their reported lists, give me clues about set of departments
that students possibly consider for their choices. By using this information, I can reduce
the whole set into individual and smaller sets that I can work without worrying big sets and
without imposing any selection process to students’ choice sets. To construct these sets, I
benefited from the choice function C() of students. This function selects some departments
from a whole department set D . Ci(D) is the choice list of student i. It gives some revealed
attributes (Ai) student i’s department selection. I use a subset of these revealed attributes
(A∗i ⊂ Ai) to create consideration set Di ⊂D .
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Table 9: Students Fixed Attributes
No Attributes Description
1. Exam Scores Students scores in OSS Exam in all fields
2. Demographic attributes
Age
Sex 1 for male, 2 for female
Location (which city student live) Center of the city used in the calculations
Family income income index from 1 to 12.
3. Educational History Attributes
High school type
OBP(High school GPA)
Students field type
4. Students perception about the exam
Concern
Importance for the success in future life
5. Family attributes
Siblings number
Siblings education levels
Parents occupations
Parents education levels
Table 10: College Fixed Attributes
No Attributes Description
1. Previous year entrance Scores
Minimum entry scores
Maximum entry scores
2. University department quota
3. Field of department
4. Location Center of the city used in the calculations
5. City attributes
Average income levels
Average cultural facilities
Cost of living index
6. College type State or Foundation
7. College Country University place in Turkey or not
8. University specific attributes
Name of university
Popularity of university
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Table 9 and 10 give descriptions of students and college attributes from the survey and
various other databases([17], [3] ). I call these attributes fixed attributes because they are
independent from any interaction with students and colleges and same for all observations.
In Table 11, interactions between students and college attributes can be seen. The inter-
actions are formed by multiplying attributes of students and colleges or by generating new
variables by using these attributes. The reason to use interaction variables is the fixed effects
regression. Because students’ fixed attributes drop in the estimation, using them together
with college fixed attributes provides an environment so as to insert students’ attributes in the
estimations. Most of our interaction variables in the form of multiplication of attributes; how-
ever, distance variables require special attention in our analysis. First one of these variables is
the standard kilometer distance of city centers. Each student’s high school city and colleges
cities are taken as the basis for the distances. Second distance variables are score variables.
A students’ CSSP score can be in the three regions with respect to previous year entrance
scores of departments. I split score variables in three parts to investigate the differences in
these regions. One of the score variables is a dummy variable which represents whether stu-
dents’ scores from the previous year are in the departmental acceptance range or not. The
remaining two variables are continuous and they show the distance of students’ scores from
departments’ minimum and maximum entry scores from the previous year. Hence, a stu-
dent’s score variable is the only one of these three variables. For example, when a student
has a score lower than the minimum entry score of selected department from the previous
year, the only score variable is the distance of student score and departmental minimum entry
score among the student variables. The other two score variables get 0. Other interactions
are just multiplication of attributes.
Revealed attributes are applied score range, applied diploma programs and distance vari-
ables. Applied score range is obtained by students’ choice lists and departmental minimum
entry scores from the previous year. Range between student’s maximum scored choice and
minimum scored choice give us the applied score range.
Revealed attributes are applied score range, applied diploma programs and distance vari-
ables. Applied score range is obtained by students’ choice lists and departmental mini-
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mum entry scores from the previous year. Range between student’s maximum scored choice
and minimum scored choice give us the applied score range. Diploma programs are generated
in order to work easier with too much variety of departments. We call diploma programs a set
of departments which are generally the same majors with different names in different colleges
or they are so similar to be considered within the same major. Hence we reduce the number
of selected programs to 138. On average, 3.5 degree programs were selected by students in
our sample.
The subset of revealed attributes used in the formation of consideration set contains re-
vealed score range and revealed applied departments. Reduction of choice sets with these
revealed attributes relieve our problems as much as possible. Because we don’t have data or
a method to learn students’ belief about the probability of being accepted to departments, it
is difficult to appoint sets excluded from score effects. By using applied score range, it is
possible to reduce sets without imposing any score range on students’ decisions about their
beliefs. Also, students could apply to all departments in this range independent from score
effects. Limiting interest to only applied programs makes consideration sets independent
from diploma program preferences. Hence these sets provide an environment for a study
independent from scores’ effects and major preferences.
3.4 Comparison of Choice Sets
In order to control consideration set suitability for the analysis, I compare them with
some random choice sets. The two random choice sets are generated from the same observa-
tion numbers with consideration sets to reach results independent from choice set numbers.
The first choice sets are random sets which the unselected departments in the choice sets
are randomly selected from the whole CSSP department set. In this randomization there is
no restriction such a field or score. The second random set is formed by randomization of
departments from the selected diploma programs. Students reveal their preferred programs
in their choice lists when they report their list to the CSSP. As explained before I reduce the
number of programs to 138. By using this information, random sets within selected diploma
programs are constructed. I looked at the explanatory power of whole estimations and some
variables separately in these choice sets. Pseudo R2 measures of regressions from the dif-
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ferent sets provide a method for comparison. Additionally, I control log likelihood ratios of
regression to check whether my method is correct.
Table 12: Estimation Results from Different Choice Sets
Variables Random Set Random within dip. Consideration Set
Distance (dis) -0.521*** -0.111*** -0.166***
(0.0112) (0.000101) (0.0103)
Foundation (F) -6.658*** -6.212*** -4.855***
(0.195) (0.148) (0.173)
Min Score Distance -0.0443*** -0.0223*** -0.0233***
(0.00027) (0.000243) (0.000253)
Interval 0.0104 0.0959*** 0.169***
(0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0109)
Max Score Distance -0.00846*** -0.00971*** -0.00891***
(0.000156) (0.000158) (0.000158)
Evening Education (eve) -0.852*** -0.430*** -0.477***
(0.0815) (0.0716) (0.0728)
Scholarship (sch) -0.0625 -1.956*** -3.293***
(0.322) (0.314) (0.319)
Cost of living -0.487*** -0.105*** -0.163***
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0202)
Two-year program -1.309*** -1.265*** -1.387***
(0.0665) (0.0722) (0.0744)
Parents educ*dis -0.0184*** -0.0061*** -0.0065***
(0.00151) (0.00143) (0.00147)
Parents educ*F 0.252*** 0.389*** 0.204***
(0.0236) (0.0201) (0.0241)
Parents educ*MetropolCity 0.0374*** 0.164*** 0.179***
(0.0101) (0.0095) (0.00976)
Parents educ*sch -0.168*** -0.302*** -0.141***
(0.0299) (0.0313) (0.032)
Parents educ*eve -0.0690*** -0.00349 0.00299
(0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0115)
Income*F 0.401*** 0.308*** 0.399***
(0.0104) (0.00864) (0.0104)
Income*dis -0.0104*** -0.0091*** -0.0118***
(0.000682) (0.000639) (0.000646)
Income*MetropolCity -0.0201*** 0.0199*** 0.0363***
(0.00507) (0.00497) (0.00499)
Income*sch -0.180*** -0.160*** -0.203***
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – Continued from previous page
Variables Random Set Random within dip. Consideration Set
(0.0127) (0.0132) (0.014)
Income*eve 0.0746*** 0.0796*** 0.0845***
(0.00532) (0.00506) (0.00515)
Distance*MetropolCity -0.0376*** 0.0508*** 0.0385***
(0.00275) (0.00272) (0.00274)
Score*F -0.000619 0.000901*** -0.00631***
(0.000487) (0.000336) (0.000371)
Score*dis 0.002*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0000275) (0.0000245) (0.0000246)
Score*MetropolCity 0.00548*** -0.00144*** -0.00118***
(0.000147) (0.000131) (0.000135)
Score*sch 0.0113*** 0.0141*** 0.0200***
(0.000869) (0.000821) (0.000829)
Score*eve 0.00121*** -0.00212*** -0.00219***
(0.000221) (0.000183) (0.000186)
Gender*eve 0.0322 0.0908*** 0.0965***
(0.0215) (0.0206) (0.0208)
Gender*F -0.000373 -0.106*** 0.170***
(0.039) (0.0325) (0.0388)
Gender*mc -0.395*** -0.0972*** -0.115***
(0.02) (0.0195) (0.0197)
Gender*dis -0.0378*** -0.0464*** -0.0459***
(0.00278) (0.00262) (0.00265)
Gender*sch -0.115** -0.0833 -0.376***
(0.0506) (0.0514) (0.0536)
Locationtype*F 0.357*** 0.210*** 0.241***
(0.0359) (0.02) (0.0356)
Locationtype*dis -0.0159*** -0.0467*** -0.0240***
(0.00217) (0.00155) (0.00205)
Locationtype*MetropolCity -0.149*** 0.0546*** 0.00108
(0.0142) (0.011) (0.0139)
Siblingsnumber*dis 0.0036*** 0.0061*** 0.0074**
(0.000656) (0.000629) (0.000646)
Siblingsnumber*eve -0.0348*** -0.0368*** -0.0394***
(0.00639) (0.00598) (0.0062)
Siblingsnumber*MetropolCity -0.0528*** -0.0180*** -0.00215
(0.00494) (0.00461) (0.00464)
Siblingsnumber*F -0.0756*** -0.0200** -0.0934***
(0.0137) (0.00885) (0.0143)
Siblingsnumber*sch -0.0176 -0.0939*** -0.0304
(0.0218) (0.0212) (0.0223)
Income*costofliving 0.0295*** 0.0219*** 0.0149***
Continued on next page
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(0.00191) (0.00192) (0.00193)
Gender*costofliving 0.0488*** -0.0238*** -0.0197**
(0.00869) (0.00875) (0.00883)
Gender*two-yearprog 0.134*** 0.427*** 0.419***
(0.0296) (0.0332) (0.0336)
Income*two-yearprog -0.0693*** -0.0607*** -0.0589***
(0.00605) (0.00667) (0.00681)
Locationtype*costofliving 0.0509*** 0.0107** 0.0458***
(0.00452) (0.00501) (0.00457)
Pseudo R2 0.2428 0.1209 0.1209
Observations 611,402 637,581 630,633
Number of groups 5,040 5,092 5,039
Table 12 shows regression results from three different choice sets. Pseudo R2 ratios of
regressions are significantly different. Random sets have highest pseudo R2 and they explain
nearly as twice as the other two sets. Consideration sets and random set within diploma pro-
grams have almost the same pseudo R2. However, when we look at Table 13, the explanatory
power of the variables show differences. Even if pseudo R2 ratio is highest in the random set,
most of the explanatory power of the estimation comes from score variables. This is the clear
proof of the strategic behavior of students and our aim is to avoid this. Random set within
diploma programs are eliminated from major preferences, but score variables have a powerful
explanatory power in these sets. On the other hand, when we reduce our set within applied
score range we almost eliminate all of the score variables variation in the data. This elimina-
tion provides us to construct our estimation approach without further struggling with scores’
effects on choices. For the other variables, again consideration sets are better. Explanatory
power of each variable is increased. Hence we can explain better the impact of attributes on
choice behavior of students with excluded score effects.
23
Table 13: Comparison of Choice Sets
Variables Random Random within Diploma Consideration Set
Distance 0.0285 0.0418 0.0449
Score 0.1453 0.0387 0.001
Foundation 0.0007 0.0001 0.0007
Evening education 0.0001 0.0038 0.0018
Scholarship 0.00006 0.0033 0.0085
Distance crosses 0.031 0.0954 0.0509
Cost of living 0.0003 0.0063 0.0048
Two-year program 0.0003 0.0128 0.0011
When I compare coefficients of the variables, it is seen that there are considerable differ-
ences. In particular, distance, scholarship, night education, cost of living, and score variables’
coefficients are differentiated in the random set. Variety of departments in the random sets
causes formation of choice sets with departments which have many different attributes. These
change estimation coefficients for random choice set from the other. For instance, distance
avoidance is almost 4 times more than other choice sets. Because of the random assign-
ment of departments to the choice set, possibly many far away colleges’ departments do not
represent selected departments and distance avoidance is enhanced.
Furthermore, in order to check consideration sets I change the size of the set by playing
with the scores range of our sets. I looked at regression outcomes by expanding the score
range by adding extra ranges to revealed ranges. The results of these choice sets show that
the explanatory power of variables decreased apart from score variables with the expansion
of the ranges. Since the strategic effects of choices show their power in the larger score
range sets, using consideration sets within revealed applied ranges is a better way to estimate
preferences.
3.5 Estimation Results
Table 14 shows the 2 different estimation results. In the first column all students who
report choices are included in the estimation.The second column is for students who did
not live in metropolitan areas. Because the demographic, socioeconomic and educational
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background characteristics of students from metropolises are fairly different from students
from other cities, I want to check the effects of these differences on choices.
Table 14: Estimation Results
Variables 1 2
Distance(dis) -0.168*** -0.00288***
(0.0115) (0.0135)
Foundation(F) -7.016*** -6.274***
(0.18) (0.25)
Min Score Distance -0.00336*** -0.00253***
(0.000317) (0.000396)
Interval 0.0720*** 0.135***
(0.0118) (0.0143)
Max Score Distance -0.00278*** -0.00113***
(0.000247) (0.000315)
Evening Education(eve) -1.056*** -1.107***
(0.0788) (0.0998)
Scholarship(sch) 1.365*** 0.616
(0.357) (0.52)
Cost of living -0.150*** -0.196***
(0.022) (0.027)
Two-year program -1.086*** -1.113***
(0.149) (0.183)
Parents educ*dis -0.0049*** -0.006***
(0.00162) (0.00188)
Parents educ*F 0.438*** 0.416***
(0.0251) (0.0357)
Parents educ*MetropolitanCity 0.115*** 0.101***
(0.0108) (0.013)
Parents educ*sch -0.335*** -0.354***
(0.038) (0.0517)
Parents educ*eve 0.00647 -0.0388***
(0.0125) (0.0149)
Income*F 0.300*** 0.220***
(0.0105) (0.0149)
Income*dis -0.0131*** -0.008***
(0.000723) (0.000856)
Income*MetropolitanCity 0.0278*** 0.0314***
(0.00557) (0.00679)
Income*sch -0.147*** -0.0441*
(0.0166) (0.0241)
Income*eve 0.0878*** 0.119***
Continued on next page
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(0.00554) (0.00693)
Distance*MetropolitanCity 0.0359*** 0.104***
(0.00306) -0.00358
Score*F 0.00623*** 0.00556***
(0.000411) (0.000595)
Score*dis 0.0008*** 0.0008***
(0.0000281) (0.0000331)
Score*MetropolitanCity -0.00118*** -0.00122***
(0.000146) (0.000185)
Score*sch 0.0008 0.00187
(0.000923) (0.00139)
Score*eve -0.000146 -0.000101
(0.000202) (0.000253)
Gender*eve 0.0993*** 0.146***
(0.0224) (0.0267)
Gender*F -0.180*** -0.0989*
(0.0402) (0.059)
Gender*MetropolitanCity -0.0561*** -0.113***
(0.0215) (0.0256)
Gender*dis -0.0442*** -0.0337***
(0.00296) (0.00341)
Gender*sch -0.0254 -0.257***
(0.0624) (0.0913)
Locationtype*F 0.122*** 0.127***
(0.0232) (0.0428)
Locationtype*dis -0.0483*** -0.0139***
(0.00175) (0.00251)
Locationtype*MetropolitanCity 0.0642*** -0.00933
(0.0122) (0.0193)
Siblingsnumber*dis 0.0076*** 0.0061***
(0.000722) (0.00085)
Siblingsnumber*eve -0.0351*** -0.0645***
(0.00645) (0.00834)
Siblingsnumber*MetropolitanCity -0.0225*** -0.0548***
(0.00521) (0.0067)
Siblingsnumber*F -0.0262** 0.0359***
(0.0105) (0.0121)
Siblingsnumber*sch -0.0989*** -0.147***
(0.0234) (0.0303)
Income*costofliving 0.0226*** 0.0158***
(0.00209) (0.00254)
Gender*costofliving -0.0158* -0.000517
Continued on next page
26
Table 14 – Continued from previous page
Variables 1 2
(0.00951) (0.0112)
Gender*two-yearprog 0.487*** 0.671***
(0.0708) (0.0952)
Income*two-yearprog -0.0583*** -0.111***
(0.0131) (0.0183)
Locationtype*costofliving 0.0194*** 0.0494***
(0.00545) (0.00825)
Observations 753518 466537
Number of groups 5047 3374
As expected, I find that the applicants of the university entrance exam prefer departments
whose last year entrance scores are similar to students’ own exam scores. Students do not
prefer departments whose last year minimum entry score is higher than their exam scores or
when the last year maximum entry scores are lower than students’ scores. Even though we
constrain our consideration sets with students’ revealed score ranges, the preference over de-
partments is more for departments whose last year acceptance score range contains their exam
scores. Students avoid departments far away from their hometown. However, the distance
preferences show differences according to certain attributes. Increase in average parents’ ed-
ucation level and income level, living in a higher populated area, and being female strengthen
this avoidance. On the other hand, higher exam scores and having more siblings reduce the
avoidance of distance in preferences. Colleges administered by foundations and which re-
quire paying higher tuition fees are not preferred by applicants. Conversely, students from
higher income levels, from educated families and who live in bigger cities show less avoid-
ance to foundation colleges as expected. Moreover, departments which provide scholarships
to students are the more preferred ones among all others. Again expectedly, night education
and two-year vocational programs are not preferred from the general part of the sample.
Student preferences are not only related with colleges, but students also make their selec-
tion according to the city. In order to understand city preferences of students we add some city
attributes to our estimation. The most important city attribute is the cost of living index. Stu-
dents’ choices show that studying in an expensive city is not preferred. Especially for female
students and students from lower income groups, this avoidance is enhanced. Metropolitan
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cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) are the most expensive places to live and study. Despite
the high number of colleges in these cities, higher living costs make them less preferable.
In order to understand risk preferences of students, I investigate students’ score distance
from the previous year’s minimum entry scores. It is a suitable parameter to analyze risk
because the amount of distance directly gives the risk level. The more the distance between
scores, the lower the probability of students to enter the department. Therefore, it is reason-
able to say that students whose department choices have, on average, more distance from the
minimum entry scores are more risk lover than others. Results show that female students and
interestingly students who come from higher income groups avoid more riskier choices.
Table 15: Estimation Results
Variables Rank-Logit Conditional-Logit
Distance -0.214*** -0.248***
(0.0013) (0.00152)
Foundation -0.0786*** -0.149***
(0.0151) (0.0175)
Min Score Distance -0.00461*** -0.00536***
(0.000269) (0.000293)
Interval 0.106*** 0.179***
(0.0109) (0.0126)
Max Score Distance -0.00177*** -0.00148***
(0.000232) (0.000242)
Evening Education -0.429*** -0.470***
(0.01) (0.0111)
Scholarship -1.558*** -1.677***
(0.028) (0.0306)
Two-year program -0.726*** -0.828***
(0.0319) (0.0346)
Finally, estimation results show differences with the changes in the methods. In order
to increase understanding and compare results in different estimations, I reduce number of
independent variables in the estimations. Therefore, I eliminate various effects of students
attributes on college preferences. Table 15 shows two basic estimation results without ana-
lyzing students attributes impacts on college attributes. The regressions are made with the
consideration sets and in both regression same data is used. In the first column the results
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come from rank ordered regression. In the second column the estimation results are from
the conditional logistic regression. These results shows that canceling ranking weights in
estimation increases coefficients magnitudes. One possible meaning of these increase is the
departments which are ranked higher in the choice list are not same preferences with the total
choice list. Results show that students avoid less distance, foundation college, and depart-
ments which support scholarship. Interestingly, evening education and two-year vocational
programs are also less avoided from student for higher ranked choices. Avoidance from de-
partments with scholarship in both regressions needs further investigation. Decreasing in
minimum score distance coefficient is expected, because students ranks departments which
have higher minimum entry score in the first places in the their choice lists. Similarly, in-
crease in the maximum score distance coefficient shows the reverse of this change.
4 A Discussion on Effects of Attribute Differences in Col-
lege Choice Preferences
As it was previously noted above, having different attributes change student preferences.
Gender, income level, location type and size, parents’ educational levels and exam scores
have significant effects on student choices. In this section, I seek to analyze whether these
estimated preferences create a stratification in labor market outcomes.
Colleges have impact an impact on their students when they are studying and after they
graduate. There are clear-cut differences in many directions between students from more
prestigious or provincial universities. The situation is the same for Turkey. There are some
high-quality colleges, which are perceived better in the labor market. Therefore, we can say
that probabilities of finding better job opportunities of students who have graduated from
these colleges are higher. Another criterion for the job market is the possibility of finding a
job in the area where the college is located. Students who are studying in colleges located
where job possibilities are concentrated and which require more high educated labor have
more chances for finding better jobs by networking. These are the main two factors in order
to evaluate labor market outcomes of colleges.
TEPAV (2007) [15] conducted a study about higher education and labor market in Turkey.
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The report shows differences in college graduates’ earnings from selected universities and de-
partments. The study is based on data generated by interviewing and making questionnaires
with firms, colleges and students. The report finds that ”for university graduates, private sec-
tor thinks that school of graduation is more important than the match between the job and the
department graduated from.” Moreover, ”the average high school, vocational high school, vo-
cational college, open-university and university graduates earn 734, 772, 818, 1109 and 1450
YTL respectively, there are significant differences between universities and departments.”
According to the findings, it is shown that regional business and industrial needs change the
wages of graduates significantly.
In Turkey, metropolitan districts (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) host both almost all of the pres-
tigious colleges and the main part of various industries. Therefore, these areas are the best
places in Turkey to study and find jobs. This clustering of colleges provides a useful compar-
ison criterion. Estimation results show that students who are from lower income groups; who
live smaller locations; who have less educated parents; and who are female have a significant
negative preference for metropolitan areas. An interesting result is that students with higher
scores may also show an avoidance for metropolitan cities. Students with higher scores have
higher probabilities to be accepted to departments which always have higher minimum entry
scores compared to previous years. Although most of these departments are located in the
metropolitan cities of Turkey, students with higher scores show more avoidance to these cities
than students with lower scores. One of the reasons for this is the higher cost of living in the
metropolitan areas. When I look at the cost of living index of cities, it can be shown that
students from lower income levels and female students in particular have an extra avoidance
for expensive cities.
In order to eliminate the effects of students living in metropolitan areas, I look at the
estimation results of students from other cities of the country (Column 2 in Table 14). In
this estimation, again female students and low-income students don’t prefer to choose de-
partments in the metropolitan cities of Turkey. Interestingly, for students who are not from
metropolitan cities, the increase in the size of residential areas increases the avoidance of
metropolitan colleges.
Distance preferences is also a constraint for some groups. Estimation results show a
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strong avoidance from the long distance choices. This preference makes students more im-
mobile, especially female students and forces them to find colleges in a restricted area. Hence
students living in the periphery of the country do not prefer to go to colleges far away even if
they are better.
Two-year vocational programs and foundation college preferences give a clue about the
educational quality and future job finding of students. Students who have graduated from
vocational programs are less likely to find high-earning jobs. It is shown from the estimation
results that female students show less avoidance to these programs. This creates a gap be-
tween male and female student outcomes in the job market. Foundation colleges are avoided
more by women and lower income group students. Being a student in these colleges requires
significant amount of funds and it is expected that students from poorer families will have a
negative preference to them. However, surprisingly, female students tend to avoid them more
than male students.
In the end, it is seen that preferences of students who are female; who are living away from
metropolitan areas; who are from low-income groups cause them to be in a disadvantaged
position for the labor market. Conversely, students who live in metropolitan cities and who
have higher educated parents have more chances to find higher earned jobs.
5 Conclusion
Using a data set from the CSSP system and a representative survey of students, I first
estimate students’ college preferences. By appointing consideration sets to each student to
help dealing with the huge number of departments alternative in the CSSP system, I am able
to reach more significant results from the estimations. Comparisons of consideration sets
with the random sets indicate the strength of consideration sets in estimation.
I document that differences in attributes (such as gender, income, type of location, etc.)
among students affect their college choices under the control of their scores and major prefer-
ences. According to estimation results, a variety of attributes among students causes them to
make their choices differently. Especially, differences in income, gender and location create
a significant preference variety. On the other hand, avoidance from out of range departments,
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long distance from students’ location, foundation colleges and two-year vocational programs
are common preferences.
Finally, I analyze the outcomes of these preferences by using possible placements. Qual-
ity, ranking of colleges, job possibilities of cities, and perception of colleges in the labor
market are used in the assessment of these outcomes. The findings show that preferences
cause preservation of gaps between females and males, rich and poor, and those living in
disadvantaged areas and metropolitan areas. Hence highly selective colleges consequently
result in high-wage occupations and industries continue to be dominated by males, from
higher income groups and those who have been brought up in bigger cities.
Based on the results obtained in this study, I conclude that CSSP data provide valuable
insights toward understanding the heterogeneity in college choices. Reported evidence on
differences in college choices do not only provide an explanation for the persistent attribute
gaps in highly selective college enrollments, high-wage occupations and industries, but it also
offers a new perspective on heterogeneity in school choice.
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